28th April 2003
The Europe - U.S. Divide
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by Erich Marquardt -- Source: www.pinr.com
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The recent tensions between the United States and Western Europe show no
sign of abating and further highlights the growing differences between these
former allies. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the traditional threat to
Western Europe dissolved. Throughout the 90s, the U.S. began to realize that
without the threat of the Soviet Union, there was no state which to protect
the European continent from. Furthermore, the U.S. could now pursue its
envisioned foreign policy without having to be overly concerned with the
opinions of those in Europe -- whether it be the public or the politicians
and diplomats; without Europe being threatened, European states had no cards
to play against the United States, as the French consistently had done in
conflicts such as the one in Vietnam. Despite this lack of dependence,
during the first decade after the fall of the Soviet Union the United States
continued to pursue its traditional role in European relations: in 1991 the
Bush administration worked with Europe to attack Iraq in the Gulf War, and
later in the decade the Clinton administration worked with Europe to attack
Serbia in the Balkans.
Throughout this decade, even though neither the Bush administration nor the
Clinton administration necessarily needed Europe to achieve their interests,
the link between European states and the United States was too strong to
circumvent. While the U.S. did flex its muscles more during the decade after
the Soviet Union's fall in 1991, by and large it continued to work with its
traditional allies in Western Europe and through the multilateral
institution of the United Nations. All of this changed with the election of
George W. Bush in the fall of 2000.
The coming to power of the Bush administration coupled with the September 11
attacks provided Washington the opportunity to reinstate full-scale power
politics back into U.S. foreign policy. This policy change reflected the
belief in Washington that the United Nations was becoming irrelevant. The
U.N. was created to restrain large powers from colliding; the need for the
United Nations was evident after World War II when for the second time in 50
years the power projections and interests of regional hegemons clashed and
resulted in much bloodshed. The purpose of the U.N. was to prevent strong
states from destroying each other again.
The need for the U.N. to restrain weak states was less clear. During the
decades after its creation, it was not the U.N. that restrained weak states
but was instead the superpowers that did so. The United States restrained
weak states within its sphere of influence and the Soviets restrained weak
states within their own sphere. Because of this reality, the U.N. was used
by the United States to check the power of the Soviet Union, while the
Soviet Union used the U.N. to check the power of the United States.
Now that the Soviet Union is gone, the only power the U.N. has left to
restrain is that of the United States, but the Bush administration has
reacted with hostility to attempts by the U.N. to restrain U.S. actions.
Therefore, what the world has now witnessed with the decision to attack Iraq
is the Bush administration taking the United States one more step away from
internationalism and one closer to power politics, which remains the
condition of world order that has prevailed since the creation of the modern
state system at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
The American disdain for being restrained by the United Nations is why the
entire world, except for isolated U.S. allies such as Great Britain, Japan,
and Australia, have felt threatened by the U.S.' latest move in Iraq. The
eyes of the world were watching to see whether the U.S. would decidedly
choose a world of power politics, or remain within the confines of
internationalism. Now, since Washington chose power politics, the world is
scrambling to adjust. The U.S. has shown that it has no need for the United
Nations since the U.S. sphere of influence now covers the entire world, as
there is no superpower to challenge its hegemony.
When a state in the Middle East now steps out of line, as Iraq did, it will
be the United States that works to restrain it, not the United Nations. If a
state in Asia steps out of line, it will also be the United States that will
work to restrain it. The entire globe is now within the United States'
sphere of influence, which has made the U.N. more impotent than ever. This
is what has so enraged Europe. By increasing its power outside the
restraints of the United Nations, the U.S. has further weakened the power of
all states still working within the United Nations.
Other states will only accept U.S. power politics if they also find the U.S.
political, economic and societal model as desirable. But this is not the
case. These disagreements express America's failure at persuasion and,
judging by history, the U.S. will not be able to rule by striking down every
state that challenges this model. This looks to be the current plan shown
through the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy.
Each time the U.S. strikes down a challenger to its rule, the U.S. is going
to have to rely more and more on coercion in order to preserve its new world
order. This state of affairs will weaken U.S. persuasion around the world
and increase the growing resentment held toward the United States. It will
further encourage potential superpowers such as China to increase its power
as to be able to rival the United States. When this happens, as it did in
World War II between the U.S. and Japan, the world could very well witness
another clash between the powers and interests of titans along with all the
negative implications that holds.