20th April 2003

Nuclear Assets of Israel

by Harold Hough -- Source: www.InformationTimes.com

Although Israel has often said that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region, Israeli officials have often publicly implied that certain circumstances - especially the use of chemical weapons by their enemies - would elicit a nuclear response. In fact, evidence indicates that Israel might launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike under certain conditions. A critical part of Israel's nuclear strategy is the Jericho 2 missile, and some insight can be gained into the Jericho 2 and its employment by studying satellite imagery of the missile base at Zachariah, several miles southeast of Tel Aviv. Off-nadir viewing by satellites like the high-resolution Indian IRS-C allows the development of three dimensional scenes, which highlight the geological structures that house the missile bunkers. Combined with other imagery and advanced enhancement techniques, significant intelligence can be gathered concerning Israel's nuclear strategy.

The Jericho 2

Several satellite images showed the massive Jericho 2 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) during training exercises on a small pad north of the nuclear weapon bunkers at the missile base at Zachariah (which in Hebrew means 'God remembers with vengeance'). The resolution makes accurate measurement difficult, but the best estimate obtainable suggests the missile transporter is about 16 m long, 4 m wide and 3 m high (according to reports, the missile is 14 m long and l.5 m wide). There is no indication of whether the TEL is wheeled or tracked, but there is no evidence that it is on rails. The missile transporter also has three support vehicles around it. Adjacent to the TEL and probably connected to it by cables is a guidance programmer and power vehicle approximately the size of a truck. On the other side of the pad, about 10 m away, are two other vehicles: probably a firing control vehicle and a communications vehicle. Such a configuration would mirror that of the Pershing II missile system deployed by the USA in Europe and then dismantled under the INF Treaty. This would confirm reports that Israel was very interested in the design of the Pershing missile and aggressively pursued US technology to build the Jericho. Although the range of the Jericho 2 is unconfirmed, scientists have estimated its maximum range as 5,000 km with a warhead of 1,000 kg: enough for a nuclear weapon.

Missile Base Vulnerability

Although the approximately 50 Jericho 2 missiles housed at Zachariah are formidable, an analysis of the base with satellite imagery shows considerable weaknesses. Even though the base was built in the 1980s, when the Soviet Union was considered a threat, the base is vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike. The Jericho 2 missile is deployed on a lightly armoured transporter and there is little above ground protection. Contrary to published reports, there are no signs of missile silos in the satellite imagery. These are distinctive, since they have heavy silo closure doors that can withstand a nearby nuclear blast and clear debris piled on top of them. Instead, the missiles appear to be stored in limestone caves under the site. If ordered to attack, the missiles would leave their underground shelters and move to prepared cul-de-sacs or deploy around the countryside. Clearly, the missile base was not designed to survive a Soviet attack since an accurate Soviet ICBM could easily destroy the base and everything underground. According to analysts, Israeli strategy vis-a-vis the USSR was to immediately retaliate, before the base was destroyed.

Although the Soviet threat is gone, the missile base remains vulnerable to a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile such as the Chinese M-9, which has a CEP of 300 m - accurate enough to threaten the base. Although accuracy and the type of nuclear explosion would determine the extent of the damage, a quick review of the effects of a nuclear blast raise serious questions about Zachariah's ability to survive a Third World-produced nuclear missile. If a missile containing a crude, 20 kiloton nuclear warhead detonated 2,200 m above and 1,000 m away from its intended target within Zachariah, the surface target would still sustain severe damage from heat, radiation and blast effects. Two kilometres from ground zero, the shock wave (at 34.5 KPa) would be powerful enough to destroy unreinforced buildings and unprotected TELs, while the thermal radiation (10 calories/cm2) would be enough to ignite combustible materials. If the base were hit with missiles having the accuracy of the M-9, even reinforced underground caves would be seriously damaged by a ground burst.

ICBM silos like those in the USA and Russia are designed to protect the crew and equipment from the blast, heat and radiation damage of a nearby nuclear blast. Constructed from above ground and then covered with dirt, they are built using a single cement pour to provide structural integrity and shock support and incorporate tunnels that can survive the fracturing and ground movement sustained by a ground burst while allowing instant access to the surface.

The base at Zachariah is built in a limestone region and probably uses caves, which are common to the area. An analysis of three-dimensional imagery based on satellite data shows entrances leading into several small hills, which have probably been hollowed out to house the Jericho 2 and its TELs. In the case of the two largest bunker complexes, hills surround the entrances to the bunkers, providing a degree of protection to the entrance. However, these caves cannot be reinforced to provide the same blast protection as a specially built blast- proof bunker. Even a low-yield nuclear ground blast could fracture and shift the ground enough for tunnels leading from the bunkers to the surface to be impassable to TELs. Since the missile site covers an area smaller than 6 x 4 km, just a few nuclear- tipped missiles might neutralise Israel's missile threat and damage the nearby bunkers holding the air force's nuclear gravity bombs. By being vulnerable to a ballistic missile with a crude nuclear device, Israel may be forced to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike rather than risk losing its ability to respond with nuclear weapons. This vulnerability appears to show an inertia within the Israeli military and has serious implications for the region. Instead of reviewing its nuclear strategy after the fall of the Soviet Union and focusing on making a nuclear deterrent that could survive an attack by Third World nuclear weapons, Israel continued to focus on producing more nuclear weapons as if envisioning a nuclear exchange with a geographically large country.

During the Cold War both US and Soviet leaders had numerous false indications of attacks by the other side. In each case, the leaders waited until further evidence showed that the launch signal was false. Part of this willingness to wait was due to the knowledge that their nuclear deterrent was dispersed throughout their country and hardened against attack.

Nuclear Weapon Bunkers

Just to the south of the Jericho 2 training pad are several bunkers thought to contain nuclear gravity bombs for Israel's attack squadrons at the Tel Nof air base just a few kilometres to the northwest. Although some bunker dimensions vary, five of the larger ones are about 15 m wide and 20 m long. The above-ground height is 6 m. In all, there are 21 pads, each with a bunker. The scarring around the site indicates that the bunkers were built at different times, and the condition of the roads leading to each bunker indicates that they are all in use.

The size and number of bunkers indicates that Israel's nuclear arsenal is larger than many estimate. If Israel's nuclear gravity bombs are similar to those of the USA, then their approximate dimensions are 4 m long, 0.5 m wide and about 350 kg in weight. Assuming the devices are stacked three high, that they are only stored along the wall of the bunker so the bunker centre can be used for testing and maintenance and that each bomb is given a space of 5 m x l m x l m, then the larger bunkers could conservatively house more than 30 weapons each. Consequently, just the five large bunkers at this site could alone easily store about 150 weapons. This is more than other reports state and supports indications that the Israeli arsenal may contain as many as 400 nuclear weapons with a total combined yield of 50 MT (see JIR Special Report No. 14, p.15).

The size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal, the uncertainty of how it would be used and the risk of a mistake raises many questions in the unstable Middle East. Although Israel is the dominant conventional military power in the region, could the vulnerability of its nuclear force tempt the Israeli Government to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against another country? There is also the question of Israel's growing nuclear arsenal - even though its enemies are geographically small and militarily weaker. These questions must be answered if a serious miscalculation is to be avoided in the future.