Syria Iran and United States

Source: www.pinr.com

Washington Makes Distinction Between Syria and Iran	7th February 2007
by Dario Cristiani

The problems experienced by the United States in Iraq and the consequential perception of U.S. geopolitical and strategic weakness within the Middle East have caused the Bush administration to make some adjustments to its Middle East policy. On January 10, 2007, Bush unveiled his new strategy for Iraq. The most important aspect of this strategy was the decision to send more than 20,000 additional U.S. troops to the country. This surge in troops is aimed to stabilize Iraq and to rebuild and adapt a security framework, even though this policy appears inadequate in the long-term. [See: "Intelligence Brief: U.S. Moves to Implement the Surge Strategy"]

Bush's speech about the new Iraq strategy acknowledges some of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group report. One significant recommendation, however, has not been supported by the Bush administration: the need to engage Iran and Syria within a new, stable, regional political architecture and to consider both countries as important elements for the security balance in the Middle East. Thus, the report highlights the necessity of talking with Tehran and Damascus in order to stabilize Iraq. This passage has been contested by several important U.S. observers, such as the neo-conservative faction that claims this action would amount to capitulation to the enemies of the United States.

Bush, in his speech, did not mention the possibility of engaging Iran and Syria with the aim of stabilizing Iraq and the Middle East. It is possible, however, to see signals that the Bush administration is beginning to make a distinction between Iran and Syria.

From a strictly rhetorical point of view, such differences are hard to find. Bush, talking about recent strife in Lebanon, said that "Syria, Iran and Hezbollah are working to destabilize Lebanese society," adding that their goals are clear and that those actors want to avoid Hezbollah's disarmament, to obstruct the establishment of a tribunal to investigate former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's death and to bring down the Fuad Siniora-led government. Beyond the classical, bitter rhetoric of Bush against Iran and Syria, however, some differences in the U.S. approach toward the two countries can be found. The administration appears to be separating Syria from Iran.

The opening of dialogue with Iran appears impossible at this juncture. Within the Middle East, a geopolitical competition is emerging between the United States, which is still the dominant power, and Iran, which represents a prominent regional rising power that is challenging U.S. influence in the region. The Bush administration authorized a new, more intensive policy against Iran with the aim of weakening Tehran's ambitions in the broader Middle East.

Indeed, many important recent decisions by the United States in the Middle East -- such as the choice to move the U.S.S. John C. Stennis aircraft carrier fleet into the Persian Gulf, the arrest of six Iranians in Irbil, and the arrival of 16 F-16 fighter aircraft at the Incirlik airbase in Turkey -- are all signs of Washington's will to dissipate the image of a power in trouble and to regain leverage over Iran. [See: "Intelligence Brief: U.S. Moves to Regain Leverage over Iran"]

Moreover, according to the Washington Post, Washington wants to destroy Iranian influence from Afghanistan to Lebanon, obstruct Iran's controversial nuclear program, and weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Instead, it is likely that Washington, even though the rhetoric seems to signal otherwise, may be pursuing a different approach toward Syria. In his State of the Union speech, Bush concentrated more attention on Iran than Syria as a menace to U.S. interests within the area. Damascus, unlike Tehran, maintains relations with Washington. Syria and the United States have cooperated against al-Qaeda, which is perceived as a threat by both actors. Syria has been one of the terminals for the American "extraordinary rendition" program, in which the United States sends suspected terrorists for imprisonment and interrogation in foreign countries. Nevertheless, Syria remains a state "sponsor of terrorism," according to Washington.

Washington's moves toward Iran seem to be more resolute than Syria and, moreover, Iran has different geopolitical goals than Syria, representing a stronger matter of concern for the United States. Recently, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad sent a message to the United States about improving their relations. In an interview with the Italian newspaper La Repubblica on December 15, 2006, the Syrian president said clearly that he wants to play a constructive role in Iraq and in the overall region, but he added that "states work for their interests, always; and Syria works for its own interests. These interests for us are recognizing our occupied land and the whole situation in the region. Will America recognize them? This is the main question." He argued implicitly that, in exchange for the Golan Heights -- which Syria could acquire through U.S. pressure on its Israeli ally -- it could be possible to start a new phase in relations between the two countries.

The Middle East Strategic Environment and Syria's Interests

The goals of Syria's foreign and regional policy in the mid- and long-term are clear. Damascus wants to gain renewed influence over Lebanese affairs. It wants to enhance its regional posture in order to negotiate with Israel from a stronger position about the issue of the Golan Heights, which represents for Syria the main key to reach an agreement with Jerusalem. It perceives, as a threat to its stability, Sunni Islamist terrorism since Syria is led by an Alawite sect, which is a religious minority in Syria, while the majority of the population is Sunni. In the orthodox Salafi orientation, Alawites are seen as a "heretic" movement within Islam.

Damascus, moreover, wants to avoid a clear and durable polarization of power within the region, thus it perceives as a threat the presence of a regional hegemon. Syria prefers a geopolitical system in which power is widespread because such a system creates the possibility of Syria playing a more effective political role in regional dynamics. Thus, Damascus, even though it is currently allied with Tehran, may want to avoid the rise of Iran as a regional superpower. [See: "The Role of Iran and Syria in the Israel-Lebanon Crisis"]

These aims interact with the strategic environment in which Syria is immersed. Such an environment has deteriorated during the past few years for Syria and, for a large part, explains its reason to enhance the relationship with Tehran, Hezbollah and Hamas and to use the Iraq conflict as an arm of pressure against the United States.

It began to shift even before Bashar came to power in late 2000, with the collapse of the peace process at the Clinton-Assad summit in Geneva in March 2000. The September 11 terrorist attacks and the following global U.S.-led war on terrorism had a deeper impact on this environment, thus starting a process of increased pressure on Syria. The collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and the presence of U.S. troops near the Syrian border posed an extraordinary challenge to the stability of Bashar al-Assad's regime. This process culminated in the immense pressure placed on Syria after the assassination of Hariri in early 2005 that caused Syria to withdraw its army and to reduce its influence in Lebanon. This pressure also had a deep impact on the internal stability of the regime.

The interaction between a complicated and hostile strategic environment that weakens Syria's regional posture and its geopolitical aims explains Syria's choices. Thus, Syria uses its closer partnership with Tehran as a tactical instrument to gain leverage within the region and to break its diplomatic isolation. This is not a strategic alliance, even though it has existed since 1979. Syria and Iran do not share the same long-term aims. Syria does not have the same geopolitical, strategic and ideological influence as Tehran and it does not have the ambition of being the strongest regional power. It is likely that Syria, if the opportunity arises, will slacken its ties with Iran in exchange for U.S. recognition of its vital interests.

Damascus does not have any ideological aversion against the United States, which contrasts with Iran, whose anti-Americanism was one of the pillars of Khomeinist ideology and an instrument of the internal struggle between the different factions who share power in the country. A clear example of this was the support of Hafez al-Assad to the 1991 U.S.-led war in Iraq that followed international and U.S. recognition of Syrian influence in Lebanon. Syria opposes the United States when Washington minimizes the role and leverage of Syria within the regional balance of power, while it is ready to cooperate with the United States when it fully recognizes Syria's assertions.

A similar attitude steers the relationship between Syria and the radical armed groups within the Middle East. Syria-Hezbollah relations are deeper than during the Hafez era; however, this does not represent an ideological position. This closer relationship is rooted in the need of Bashar to have a strong arm of pressure against Israel and to reinforce its domestic position through the support of the movement that accomplished the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000.

Syria and Hezbollah share an alliance of interests, which could change when these interests diverge. It is different from the relationship that Tehran shares with Hezbollah, which is not only an alliance based on common material and strategic interests, but also on a common confessional and ideological background. Damascus offers cooperation if Washington offers adequate guarantees to Syria over the latter's geopolitical concerns and claims of influence.

Conclusion

The relationship between the United States and Syria is still contradictory and obscure. Washington is facing increasing problems in the Middle East. In his speeches, Bush continues to accuse both Iran and Syria of causing instability in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, although some political moves seem to suggest that a distinction has been made between these two countries.

If Iran is a menace for the United States in the Middle East and represents a strategic danger for the main U.S. ally in the region, Israel, Syria is different. It has important influence within these theaters of conflict but it does not have the same geopolitical, strategic and ideological weight of Iran. Since the end of the latest war in Lebanon between Hezbollah and Israel, it appears clear that Syria is still an important player in the regional dynamics, thus Bashar wants to use this renewed capability to influence regional politics in order to gain some concessions from the United States.

The next real regional struggle will be between Iran and the United States. Therefore, it is possible that, despite the current rhetoric, relations between Damascus and Washington will improve. The United States is seeking to weaken and further isolate Iran, and breaking the Damascus-Tehran axis could be an important step in such a direction. Moreover, it could gain an alignment of Syria with other Arab countries, thus obtaining an Arab arch of opposition to the rise of a Shi'a, Persian power. Finally, by improving relations with Syria, Washington could slacken the support of armed radical groups in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories and Iraq.