United States, Iran, Israel and Arab Support
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Source: www.pinr.com
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U.S. Defense Secretary Pays Visit to Arab Allies
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19th April 2007
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On April 16, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates arrived in Jordan to begin a series of visits to U.S. allies in the region. One of the main purposes of the trip is to build a common front against Iran's attempts to increase its regional power. His trip to Jordan, Egypt and Israel will focus on pursuing a unified strategy in relations toward Iran and on weakening Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah, in addition to continuing cooperation against threats from Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda.
The objective of the trip was confirmed by a senior U.S. defense official who spoke to Washington Post journalist Ann Scott Tyson. The official stated that Gates' visit is aimed at assuring Middle Eastern leaders that the United States will work with them on "common concerns about Persian hegemony in the region," and said that the United States and Middle Eastern countries have "shared interests [and] shared enemies."
Washington recognizes that support from the region's states is critical in order to restrict Iran's rising power without having to resort to military force. Furthermore, it is a long-term strategy in case the United States is forced to execute a limited withdrawal from Iraq, which is a likely possibility. Upon such a withdrawal, the United States would lose a certain amount of influence in Iraq, while Iran would be able to make gains, especially in the south. The United States would then have to substitute the loss of influence by maintaining or boosting its presence in the Persian Gulf and forming a united bloc in the region to restrict Iranian ambitions.
As stated by the aforementioned U.S. defense official, Gates is hoping to find agreement on "Iranian bad behavior…Iranian support for terrorism in the region, Iranian meddling in internal politics with Shi'a minorities…Iranian continued support for Hezbollah." Saudi Arabia, for instance, is always concerned over its Shi'a-majority Eastern Province, where the bulk of the country's oil production is located. It is wary of Iran's potential to foment insurrection among this community. Other Arab states share this concern, such as Bahrain, which is 70 percent Shi'a yet is run by the Sunni al-Khalifa dynasty.
Apart from the Shi'a issue, there is the problem of Hezbollah. Hezbollah, which is reliant on Iranian arms and funding, has posed a threat to Israeli interests. This concern became especially prevalent after Israel's failure to rout the organization in its cross-border war in late 2006. Hezbollah is also seen as a potential threat by other regional states, such as Egypt and Jordan, due to its popularity among the Muslim masses. This was revealed during the 2006 war when support for Hezbollah across the Muslim world -- among both Sunni and Shi'a -- skyrocketed as they saw the organization "bravely" facing off Israel's superior military. Hezbollah's success on this issue revealed the Arab governments' weakness to confront Israel, fomenting anger among Muslims who increasingly saw these leaders as pawns of the United States and Israel.
Therefore, the United States is hoping to find a shared interest in preventing the rise of Iran, and Gates' visit is an effort to strengthen these relationships.
For Jordan, and to a lesser degree Egypt, supporting the United States against Iran is a path they feel is necessary. The two states are incredibly reliant on Washington for their security and stability. Their regimes are autocratic and do not enjoy support from their populations. U.S. security assistance is important for them to retain power.
Gates' visit fits PINR's analysis of the current plans of the United States in the region in light of the difficulties encountered in Iraq. As PINR stated on March 15, "A strong U.S. posture in the region will deter Iran from making excessive geostrategic gains in the Middle East. Washington has already begun this strategy, seen through its January decision to beef up its navy in the Persian Gulf."
Nevertheless, there are potential holes in this strategy. For one, Saudi Arabia is not completely trustful of U.S. policy in the region, as it doubts whether the United States will be able to stabilize conditions in Iraq. Its recent state talks with Iran show that it is keeping open the option of working with Tehran in Iraq should the United States withdraw. Despite the accepted argument that Saudi Arabia and Iran will clash over Iraq, it is possible that these two states will make a geopolitical decision to support their own respective proxy forces in the region to stabilize the conflict and increase their influence in the Middle East. Therefore, Saudi Arabia may wish to weaken U.S. pressure on Iran slightly, so that it does not burn all its connections with Tehran.
The other problem with this strategy is the inclusion of Israel. By including Israel in his visit, Gates is suggesting that Israel will be part of an Arab-Israeli anti-Iranian bloc. While Jordan may sign onto this due to its heavy dependence on Washington, it is not clear if Egypt will and it is certainly not clear whether Saudi Arabia will. Attempting to form a regional bloc that includes the Arab Middle Eastern states and also the state of Israel is probably too grandiose of a goal. It is also not necessary; the United States can continue its support for Israel while, at the same time, forming an Arab bloc to contain Iranian ambitions. Including Israel in this equation is counter-productive and will only make it harder to form such a coalition.
Therefore, while Gates' visit may assist the United States in forming a bloc to resist Iranian ambitions, there are holes in the strategy that cast it into doubt.